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We study the optimal provision of unemployment insurance (UI) over the business cycle. We
consider an equilibrium Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model with risk-averse workers
and aggregate shocks to labor productivity. Both the vacancy creation decisions of rms and the
search eort decisions of workers respond endogenously to aggregate shocks as well as to changes in
UI policy. We characterize the optimal history-dependent UI policy. We nd that, all else equal,
the optimal benet is decreasing in current productivity and decreasing in current unemployment.
Optimal benets are therefore lowest when current productivity is high and current unemployment
is high. The optimal path of benets reacts non-monotonically to a productivity shock. Following
a drop in productivity, benets initially rise in order to provide short-run relief to the unemployed
and stabilize wages, but then fall signicantly below their pre-recession level, in order to speed up
the subsequent recovery. Under the optimal policy, the path of benets is pro-cyclical overall. As
compared to the existing US UI system, the optimal history-dependent benets smooth cyclical
uctuations in unemployment and deliver non-negligible welfare gains.
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11 Introduction
In 2009, the United States paid out $76 billion in unemployment benets. The size of the unemployment
insurance (UI) system raises concerns about how the benet policy should respond to changes in un-
employment and productivity. Unemployment benets provide insurance to the unemployed, but may
distort their search behavior and rms' vacancy creation decisions, possibly exacerbating the negative
eects of a drop in productivity. To determine the optimal benet policy in the presence of aggregate
shocks we use a general equilibrium search and matching model in the style of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994). The advantage of a general equilibrium approach is that it enables us to capture the eects of
policy changes on both rms' vacancy creation and worker search behavior.
Our model features free entry of rms and endogenous worker search eort decisions. Wages are
determined by Nash bargaining and therefore respond to both aggregate productivity and the UI policy.
The vacancy posting decisions of rms respond to the UI policy because changes in the worker outside
option aect wages, and therefore the returns to posting a vacancy. Worker search eort decisions
respond to the UI policy for two reasons: rst, benets directly aect the value of being unemployed;
second, benets aect the aggregate job-nding rate, and therefore the returns to search, through their
eect on vacancy posting. Our general equilibrium approach acknowledges that the uctuations in the
returns to search are themselves endogenous and, in particular, respond to changes in policy.
We consider the optimal policy choice of a benevolent, utilitarian government that is allowed to
change unemployment benet levels in response to aggregate shocks and to run decits in some states
of nature, as long as it balances its budget on average. We solve for the optimal state-contingent
UI policy and nd that it prescribes for benets to rise immediately following a drop in productivity.
Subsequently, however, it prescribes a persistent decline in benets below their pre-recession level. Thus,
the response of benets to a negative shock is non-monotonic: it is positive in the short run (4-6 weeks
after the shock) but negative in the longer run (2-10 quarters after the shock). We nd that the optimal
path of benets is pro-cyclical overall.
2The features of the optimal benets can be explained as follows. Higher benets translate into
a lower job-nding rate through both lower returns to posting a vacancy and lower returns to search
eort. Immediately after a negative productivity shock hits, the social returns to job creation are low, so
the government is more concerned with providing short-term relief for the unemployed and slowing the
decline of wages than with inducing high job nding. It therefore raises benets temporarily, triggering
a decrease in both vacancy creation and worker search eort. Subsequently, since the shock is mean-
reverting, the government expects an economic recovery and would like to stimulate job nding, which
requires lowering benets.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the design of optimal UI policy in response to aggregate
economic conditions. While a huge literature (see, for example, Baily (1978), Shavell and Weiss (1979),
and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) for seminal contributions) has analyzed the insurance-incentives
trade-o involved in optimal UI provision, most of this literature has bypassed the optimal response of
benets to aggregate shocks. Recently, several studies (Kiley (2003) , Sanchez (2008), Andersen and
Svarer (2010, 2011), Kroft and Notowidigdo (2010), Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010)) have examined
the optimal design of a state-contingent policy. The focus of this emerging literature is the notion that
the moral hazard distortion resulting from unemployment insurance depends on the underlying state
of the economy. In particular, an argument can be made for countercyclical unemployment benets
if unemployment benets distort job search incentives less in recessions than in booms. Our paper
reassesses the desirability of such state-contingent policies in a general equilibrium framework.1 Our
result that the optimal benet path is pro-cyclical is new to this literature.
Our paper is not the rst to analyze the design of optimal unemployment insurance in equilibrium
search models. A number of studies, such as Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001), Coles and Masters
(2006), and Lehmann and van der Linden (2007), study optimal UI design in models with endogenous
job creation and wage bargaining. The contribution of our paper is to introduce aggregate productivity
1Andersen and Svarer (2010) and Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) also consider models with endogenously deter-
mined vacancy creation but assume rigid wages, implicitly assuming that changes in UI benets leave wages unaected.
3shocks into such optimal policy analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in section 2. Section 3 describes the
optimal policy. We describe how we calibrate the model to US data in section 4. We report our results
in section 5. Finally, we conclude in section 6.
2 Model description
2.1 Economic Environment
We consider an innite-horizon discrete-time model. The economy is populated by a unit measure of
workers and a larger continuum of rms.
Agents. In any given period, a worker can be either employed (matched with a rm) or unemployed.




t [u(xt)   Itc(st)];
where E0 is the period-0 expectation operator,  2 (0;1) is the discount factor, xt denotes consumption
in period t, st denotes search eort exerted in period t, and It is an indicator variable equal to 1 if
the worker is unemployed and zero otherwise. The within-period utility of consumption u : R+ ! R
is twice dierentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satises u0(0) = 1. The cost of search
eort c : [0;1] ! R is twice dierentiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex, and satises c0 (1) = 1.
An unemployed worker produces h units of the consumption good via home production. We assume
that there do not exist private insurance markets and that workers cannot save or borrow.
Firms are risk-neutral and maximize prots. We assume that workers and rms have the same
discount factor . A rm can be either matched to a worker or vacant. A rm posting a vacancy incurs
a ow cost k.
Production. The economy is subject to aggregate shocks to labor productivity. Specically, a
matched worker-rm pair produces output zt, where zt is stochastic. We assume that lnzt follows
4an AR(1) process
lnzt = lnzt 1 + ""t;
where 0   < 1, " > 0, and "t are independent and identically distributed standard normal random
variables. We will write zt = fz0;z1;:::;ztg to denote the history of shocks up to period t.
Matching. Job creation occurs through a matching function. We assume that the number of new
matches in period t equals
M (St (1   Lt 1);vt);
where 1   Lt 1 is the unemployment level in period t   1, St is the average search eort exerted by
unemployed workers in period t, and vt is the measure of vacancies posted in period t. The quantity
St (1   Lt 1) represents the measure of eciency units of worker search.
The matching function M exhibits constant returns to scale, is strictly increasing and strictly concave
in both arguments, and has the property that the number of new matches cannot exceed the number
of potential matches: M (S (1   L);v)  minfS (1   L);vg. We dene
t =
vt
St (1   Lt 1)
to be the market tightness in period t. We dene the functions
f () =
M (S (1   L);v)
S (1   L)
= M (1;) and
q () =








where f () is the job-nding probability per eciency unit of search and q () is the probability of
lling a vacancy. By the assumptions on M made above, the function f () is increasing in  and q ()
is decreasing in . For an individual worker exerting search eort s, the probability of nding a job is
sf (). Note that, when workers choose the amount of search eort s, they take as given the aggregate
job-nding probability f ().
5We assume that existing matches are exogenously destroyed with a constant job separation proba-
bility . Thus, any worker of the Lt 1 workers employed in period t 1 has a probability  of becoming




















The US UI system is nanced by payroll taxes on rms and is administered at the state level. However,
under the provisions of the Social Security Act, each state can borrow from a federal unemployment
insurance trust fund, provided it meets certain federal requirements. Motivated by these features of the
UI system, we assume that the government in the model economy can insure against aggregate shocks
by buying and selling claims contingent on the aggregate state and is required to balance its budget
only in expectation. Further, we assume that the price of a claim to one unit of consumption in state
zt+1 after a history zt is equal to the probability of zt+1 conditional on zt; this would be the case, e.g.,
in the presence of a large number of out-of state risk-neutral investors with the same discount factor.
The government levies a constant lump sum tax  on rm prots, and distributes unemployment
benets bt to unemployed workers. We allow the benet policy to depend on the entire history of past
aggregate shocks; thus the policy bt = bt
 
zt
must be measurable with respect to zt. Benets must be
the same across all unemployed workers at a point in time. They are constrained to be non-negative:
the government cannot tax home production. Since we assumed that the government has access to
nancial markets in which a full set of state-contingent claims is traded, its budget constraint collapses















g  0 (2)
62.3 Timing
The government commits to a policy (;bt ()) once and for all before the period-0 shock realizes. Within
each period t, the timing is as follows. The economy enters period t with some level of employment Lt 1.
The aggregate shock zt then realizes. Firms observe the aggregate shock and decide how many vacancies
to post, at cost k per vacancy. At the same time, workers choose their search eort st at the cost of
c(st). Together, these determine the market tightness t, and Stf ()(1   Lt 1) unemployed workers
nd jobs. At the same time, a fraction  of the existing Lt 1 matches are exogenously destroyed. All
the workers who are now employed produce zt and receive a bargained wage wt. Firms receive prots
zt  wt  . Workers who are unemployed consume their home production plus unemployment benets,
h + bt.
2.4 Worker value functions
A worker entering period t employed retains his job with probability 1   and loses it with probability
. If he retains his job, he consumes his wage wt
 
zt
and proceeds as employed to period t + 1. If he
loses his job, he consumes his home production plus benets, h + bt
 
zt
, and proceeds as unemployed
to the next period.
A worker entering period t unemployed rst chooses search eort st and suers the disutility c(st).





and remains unemployed with the complementary probabil-
ity. If he nds a job, he earns the wage wt
 
zt
and proceeds as employed to period t+1. If he remains
unemployed, he consumes his home production plus benets, h + bt
 
zt
, and proceeds as unemployed




the value after a history zt for a worker who enters period t employed. Simi-
larly, denote by Ut
 
zt
the value of an unemployed worker. The Bellman equations for employed and




















































































2.5 Firm value functions
A matched rm retains its worker with probability 1 . In this case, the rm receives the output net of
wages and taxes, zt  wt
 
zt
 , and then proceeds into the next period as a matched rm. If the rm
loses its worker, it gains nothing in the current period and proceeds into the next period unmatched.






rm nds a worker, it gets ow prots zt   wt
 
zt
   and proceeds into the next period as a matched




the value of a rm that enters period t matched to a worker, and denote by Vt
 
zt














































= zt   wt
 
zt








We assume that wages are determined according to Nash bargaining: the wage is chosen to maximize
a weighted product of the worker's surplus and the rm's surplus. Specically, the worker-rm pair









where  2 (0;1) is the worker's bargaining weight.
2.7 Equilibrium given policy
In this section, we dene the equilibrium of the model, taking as given a government policy (;bt ())
and characterize its properties.
2.7.1 Equilibrium denition
Taking as given an initial condition (z 1;L 1), we dene an equilibrium given policy:
Denition 1 Given a policy (;bt ()) and an initial condition (z 1;L 1) an equilibrium is a sequence
of zt-measurable functions for wages wt
 
zt
, search eort St
 
zt




























1. The value functions satisfy the worker and rm Bellman equations (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8)
2. Optimal search: The search eort St solves the maximization problem in (4) for st
3. Free entry: The value Vt
 
zt
of a vacant rm is zero for all zt
4. Nash bargaining: The wage maximizes equation (9)
5. Law of motion for employment: Employment satises (1)
6. Budget balance: Tax revenue and benets satisfy (2)
92.7.2 Characterization of equilibrium


































Optimal search implies the necessary rst-order condition for St:




























































































10Equations (13) and (15) imply that  t
 
zt
follows the law of motion  t
 
zt










= zt   wt
 
zt




Finally, the rst-order condition with respect to wt
 
zt
























































g through equations (3), (4), (11), (15) and (16)). Therefore, the equi-





















satisfying: the law of motion (12) for the worker surplus, the law of motion (17) for the rm's
surplus, the bargaining solution (19), the law of motion (1) for employment, and the budget constraint
(2).
3 Optimal policy
We assume that the government is utilitarian: it chooses a policy to maximize the period-0 expected
value of worker utility, taking the equilibrium conditions as constraints. In order to focus on the history-
dependence of optimal benets, we assume that the government is choosing the benet schedule but
taking the tax rate as given.
Denition 2 A policy bt
 
zt















such that (1), (12), (17), (19) hold for all zt, and the government budget
11constraint (2) is satised.





































over the set of all feasible policies.
The government's problem can be written as one of choosing a policy bt
 
zt














to maximize (20) subject to (1), (12), (17), (19) holding for all zt, and
subject to the government budget constraint (2). We nd the optimal policy by solving the system of
necessary rst-order conditions for this problem.
The optimal bt will depend not only on the current productivity zt and the current unemployment
level 1   Lt 1, but also on the entire history of past aggregate shocks. In the appendix, we show that
the optimal policy is of the form bt (zt;1   Lt 1;t 1;t 1), where t 1 and t 1 are the Lagrange
multipliers on the constraints (12) and (17), respectively, in the maximization problem (20). In other
words, the quadruple (zt;1   Lt 1;t 1;t 1) is a sucient state variable that captures the dependence
of bt on the history zt. The fact that the zt and 1   Lt 1 are not sucient reects the fact that the
optimal policy is time-inconsistent: the optimal benet bt may dier from the optimal bt0 even if zt = zt0,
Lt 1 = Lt0 1. Intuitively, the government might want to induce rms to post vacancies - and workers
to search - by promising low unemployment benets, but has an ex post incentive to provide higher
benets, so as to smooth worker consumption, after employment outcomes have realized. Including the
multipliers t;t as state variables in the optimal policy captures exactly this trade-o. Note that we
assume throughout the paper that the government can fully commit to its policy. In the appendix we
explain the method used to solve for the optimal policy.
124 Calibration
We calibrate the model to verify that it captures salient features of the US labor market, and is thus a
useful one for studying optimal policy design. We normalize mean productivity to one. We assume a
benet scheme that mimics the benet extension provisions currently in place within the US policy. In
the US, local and federal employment conditions trigger automatic 13-week and 26-week extensions (for
example if a state's unemployment rate increases above 6% it triggers a 13-week extension of benets).
In the model we assume that the level of benets automatically increases if productivity falls one or
two standard deviations below average level. In order to map the value of the extension into a level we
compute the present discounted value of the benet extensions assuming that the weekly job nding
rate falls by one half of a percentage point for each standard deviation drop in productivity. Thus, we
set normal benet levels to 0.4, and 0.42 and 0.44 when productivity is one and two standard deviations
below the mean respectively. We pick the tax rate  so that the government balances its budget if the
unemployment rate is 5.5%.







This functional form satises all the assumptions made on the search cost function; in particular, it
implies that the optimal search eort will always be less than 1 for any A > 0.
For the matching function, we follow den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) and pick
M (S (1   L);v) =
S (1   L)v
[S (1   L)
 + v]
1=
This matching technology satises all the assumptions made earlier, in particular the assumption that









The model period is taken to be 1 week. We set the discount factor  = 0:991=12, implying a
yearly discount rate of 0.96. Following Shimer (2005), labor productivity zt is taken to mean real
output per person in the non-farm business sector. This measure of productivity is taken from the
data constructed by the BLS and the parameters for the shock process are estimated, at the weekly
level, to be  = 0:9895 and " = 0:0034. The job separation parameter  is set to 0.0081 to match the
average weekly job separation rate.2 We use the Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) estimate of the costs
of vacancy creation and set k = 0:58.
This leaves four parameters to be calibrated: the matching function parameter , the coecient
of the search cost function A, the value h of home production, and the worker bargaining weight .
We jointly calibrate these four parameters to simultaneously match four data targets: (1) the average
vacancy-unemployment ratio; (2) the standard deviation of vacancy-unemployment ratio; (3) the average
weekly job-nding rate; and (4) the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to benets. The
rst three of these targets are directly measured in the data. For the elasticity of unemployment duration
with respect to benets, u;b, we use micro estimates reported by Meyer (1990) and target an elasticity
of 0.9. The table below reports the calibrated parameters.
Table 1: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target Data Model
h Home production 0.475 Average S 0.634 0.634
 Bargaining power 0.247 St. dev of ln(S) 0.259 0.259
 Matching parameter 0.428 Average Sf() 0.139 0.139
A Disutility of search 0.037 u;b 0.9 0.9
5 Results
In order to illustrate the mechanism, in Figure 1 we plot the optimal benet policy b(z;1   L;;) as a
function of z and 1 L, keeping  and  xed at their average values. The optimal benet is decreasing
2See Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) on how to obtain the weekly estimates for the job nding rate and the job
separation rate from monthly data.
14in productivity z and decreasing in unemployment 1   L. The intuition for this result is that the
optimal benet is lower in states of the world when the marginal social benet of job creation is higher,
because lower benets are used to encourage search eort by workers and vacancy creation by rms.
The marginal social benet of job creation is higher when z is higher, since the output of an additional
worker-rm pair is then higher. The marginal social benet is also higher when current employment is
lower. As a consequence, optimal benets are lowest, all else equal, when current productivity is high
and current employment is low, i.e. at the beginning of an economic recovery. This shape of the policy
function also implies that during a recession, there are two opposing forces at work - low productivity
and high unemployment - which give opposite prescriptions for the response of optimal benets. This
gives an ambiguous prediction for the overall cyclicality of benets.
In order to understand the overall behavior of the optimal policy, in Figures 2 and 3 we analyze
the response of the economy to a negative productivity shock under the optimal policy and compare
it to the response under the current policy. In Figure 2 we plot the response of the optimal policy
when productivity drops by 1% after a long sequence of productivity held at 1. Benets initially jump
up, but then fall for about two quarters following the shock, and slowly revert to their pre-shock level.
Unemployment rises in response to the drop in productivity and continues rising for about one quarter
before it starts to return to its pre-shock level. Note that the rise in unemployment is signicantly lower
than under the current benet policy. Wages also fall more gradually under the optimal policy than
they do under the current policy. In Figure 3 we plot the response of other key labor market variables.
As compared to the current benet policy, the optimal policy results in a faster recovery of the market
tightness , as well as search eort S.
The intuition for the policy response is that the government would like to provide immediate insur-
ance against the shock and, expecting future productivity to rise, would like to induce a recovery in
vacancy creation and search eort. Thus, benets respond positively to the initial drop in productivity
but negatively to the subsequent rise in unemployment - consistent with the prediction of Figure 1. The
15initial rise in benets smooths the fall in wages. The subsequent benet decline ameliorates the rise in
unemployment.
Finally, we investigate how the economy behaves over time under the optimal policy. To this end,
we simulated the model both under the current benet policy and under the optimal policy. Table 2
reports the summary statistics, under the optimal policy, for the behavior of unemployment benets b
and per-period benet expenditures b(1   L). The key observation is that, over a long period of time,
the correlation of optimal benets with productivity is positive: benets are pro-cyclical in the long
run and, in particular, negatively correlated with the unemployment rate. Moreover, this result is not
driven by any balanced budget requirement, since we allow the government to run decits in recessions.
Tables 3 and 4 report the moments of key labor market variables when the model is simulated under
the current policy and the optimal policy, respectively. These results corroborate our earlier intuition
that the benet policy serves to smooth the cyclical uctuations in unemployment.
We compute the expected welfare gain from switching from the current policy to the optimal policy.
We nd that implementing the optimal policy results in a non-negligible 0.276% welfare gain as measured
in consumption equivalent variation terms.
6 Conclusion
We analyzed the design of an optimal UI system in the presence of aggregate shocks in an equilibrium
search and matching model. Our main ndings are that optimal benets respond non-monotonically
to productivity shocks and are pro-cyclical overall, counter to previous results in the literature. In the
context of the current recession, our results suggest that the government, conditional on choosing to
extend the duration of benets, should have lowered their level over the course of the recession. We also
nd that the optimal benet policy, in addition to providing insurance to unemployed workers, results
in the smoothing of unemployment over the business cycle.
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17A Solving for the optimal policy

































be the probability of history zt = fz0;z1;:::;ztg given the initial condition z 1. Denote

























, respectively, and denote by  the Lagrange multiplier on (2). In what follows, we
suppress the dependence on zt for notational simplicity. The rst-order conditions for bt;St;wt;t;Lt,
respectively are:
(1   Lt   t)u0 (h + bt)    (1   Lt) = 0 (23)
(1   Lt 1)
 
tf (t)   c0 (St)

+ t (1   )c00 (St) +
c00 (St)
f (t)
[t 1 (1      Stf (t))   t] = 0 (24)
(Lt + t)u0 (wt)   t   tktu00 (wt) = 0 (25)
tSt (1   Lt 1)f0 (t)+(t   (1   )t 1)c0 (St)
f0 (t)
(f (t))
2 +(t   (1   )t 1)
kq0 (t)
(q (t))
2  tku0 (wt) = 0
(26)
Et [t+1 (1      St+1f (t+1)) + c(St+1)]   t + u(wt)   u(h + bt) +  ( + bt) = 0 (27)
To nd the optimal policy, we rst guess  and solve the above system of dierence equations (23)-(27)


































Then we iterate on  until the resulting policy satises the budget constraint.
Observe that the only period-t 1 variables that enter the period-t rst-order conditions are Lt 1;t 1;t 1,
and no variables from periods prior to t   1 enter the period-t rst-order conditions. This implies that
the quadruple (zt;Lt 1;t 1;t 1) is a sucient state variable for the history of shocks zt up to and
including period t. Specically, let




18be a function that satises
 
1   L0   0






f ()   c0 (S)









u0 (w)   0   ku00 (w) = 0 (30)
S (1   L)f0 () +
 







0   (1   )
 kq0 ()
(q ())










   + u(w)   u(h + b) +  ( + b) = 0 (32)
as well as
L0 = (1   )L + Sf ()(1   L) (33)
c0 (S)
f ()




















u0 (w)k = (1   )c0 (S) (36)


































satises the system (23)-(27) and (1), (12), (17), (19).
To nd the optimal policy given , we therefore solve the system of functional equations (28)-(36). We
use spectral projection methods to solve this system, using Chebyshev polynomials as our basis. The
details of the computation are in a supplementary appendix, available by request.
B Tables and gures
19Table 2: Optimal benet behavior
Benets Benet expenditures
b b  (1   L)
Mean 0.403 0.022
Standard deviation 0.024 0.034
Correlation with z 0.504 -0.360
Correlation with 1   L -0.136 0.717
Table 3: Model statistics simulated under the current US policy
z 1   L v=(1   L) Sf() v w S
Mean 1 0.059 0.634 0.139 0.035 0.953 0.760
Standard Deviation 0.013 0.128 0.259 0.170 0.130 0.011 0.090
z 1 -0.784 0.826 0.773 0.717 0.983 0.626
1   L - 1 -0.846 -0.837 -0.609 -0.703 -0.772
v=(1   L) - - 1 0.994 0.903 0.734 0.938
Correlation Sf() - - - 1 0.912 0.674 0.970
Matrix v - - - - 1 0.630 0.892
w - - - - - 1 0.512
S - - - - - - 1
Note: Means are reported in levels, standard deviations and correlations
are reported in logs as quarterly deviations from an HP-ltered trend with a
smoothing parameter of 1600.
Table 4: Model statistics simulated under the optimal policy
z 1   L v=(1   L) Sf() v w S
Mean 1 0.055 0.647 0.140 0.035 0.953 0.776
Standard Deviation 0.013 0.028 0.056 0.034 0.033 0.011 0.012
z 1 -0.876 0.762 0.742 0.539 0.924 0.627
1   L - 1 -0.895 -0.885 -0.659 -0.667 -0.823
v=(1   L) - - 1 0.999 0.925 0.456 0.982
Correlation Sf() - - - 1 0.933 0.428 0.987
Matrix v - - - - 1 0.198 0.956
w - - - - - 1 0.281
S - - - - - - 1
Note: Means are reported in levels, standard deviations and correlations
are reported in logs as quarterly deviations from an HP-ltered trend with a
smoothing parameter of 1600.































21Figure 2: Responses to 1% drop in productivity












































22Figure 3: Responses to 1% drop in productivity
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